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Abstract. In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) highlight that 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) proof of dividend irrelevance is based on the assumption that 
the amount of dividends distributed to shareholders is equal or greater than the free cash flow 
generated by the fixed investment policy. They claim that, if retention is allowed, dividend 
policy is not irrelevant. This paper shows that the dividend irrelevance proposition holds 
even in case of retention. The key assumption has not to do with retention but with the NPV 
of the extra funds (either retained or raised): if NPV is zero, dividend irrelevance applies. 
Yet, the dichotomy retention/no-retention is useful, because if agency problems are present, 
managers tend to retain funds and invest them in negative-NPV projects, and therefore the 
zero-NPV assumption must be removed, so that dividend irrelevance does not apply any 
more. 
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Relevance or irrelevance of  retention 
for dividend policy irrelevance 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A firm’s value is given by the sum of the present value of forecasted cash flows. Resting on 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition, practitioners and some 
academics do not use actual cash flows; rather, they discount potential dividends, also known 
as free cash flows or free cash flows to firm (e.g. Damodaran, 2006a,b; Colepand, Koller and 
Murrin, 2000). Magni and Vélez-Pareja (2009) support the idea that only actual cash flows 
should be discounted, whereas potential dividends distort valuation in all cases where excess 
cash retained is not invested in NPV-neutral investments. In an interesting recent paper, 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) revisit Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) paper on dividend 
policy irrelevance and claim that dividend policy is not irrelevant (see also DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2007). In the 2006 paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (DD) underline the fact that 
Miller and Modigliani (MM) assume that 100% or more of the free cash flow is distributed to 
shareholders, thus shunting aside the possibility of retention. According to DD, the 
assumption of no-retention made by MM makes dividend irrelevance a “meaningless 
tautology” (p. 306). If retention is allowed, then dividend policy is relevant, because 
managers could choose suboptimal policies by investing in non-zero NPV projects. 
 
This paper shows that relevance or irrelevance of dividend policy has not to do with 
retention; it has to do with the rate of return of the extra funds (excess cash) used for 
reinvestment or financing: dividend policy is irrelevant if and only if zero-NPV activities are 
undertaken, with or without assumption of retention. The dichotomy retention/no-retention is 
nevertheless useful, if it is reinterpreted as a regard for agency problems. 
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The paper is structured as follows. 
 
• Section 1 
 
¾ A formal unambiguous definition of dividend policy irrelevance is given 
¾ It is proved that dividend policy irrelevance holds if and only if the extra activities 
are zero-NPV activities. Therefore, MM’s thesis extends to the retention case 
¾ It is shown that MM’s assumption of fairly priced stocks is (sufficient but) not 
necessary for dividend irrelevance 
¾ It is underlined that the case of retention give managers full control on 
shareholders’ wealth, as opposed to the case of no-retention 
 
• Section 2 
 
¾ DD’s definition of dividend irrelevance is shown to be unnecessarily rigid and 
based on semantic conventions. While not all feasible dividend policies are 
optimal, all feasible dividend policies are optimal if the zero-NPV assumption is 
made (regardless of retention) 
¾ DD’s correct stance about misconceptions of dividend irrelevance is underlined: 
not only investment policy matters, dividend policy is an important determinant as 
well 
 
• Section 3 
 
¾ DD’s worry about assumptions that constrain MM’s thesis to be valid is shown to 
be unwarranted: the role of assumptions in deductive logic is just to constrain the 
thesis to be valid 
¾ DD’s concern on retention is fruitfully reinterpreted as a regard for agency 
problems. If agency problems are present, then managers are inclined to retain 
funds and undertake negative-NPV projects The concern for agency problems 
means that the zero-NPV assumption is inappropriate and should be dismissed. In 
this sense, DD’s stance is agreeable. 
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Table 1. Main Notational conventions 
 
ta   free cash flow 
td   Dividends 
)( ttt adh −=   extra funds (excess cash) 
ρ   cost of capital 
FCF  free cash flow 
n   liquidation date 
DD  DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
MM  Miller and Modigliani 
h
r
  vector of extra funds 
0
r
  null vector 
)(hV
r
  value of the firm as a function of dividend policy 
ZA  Zero-NPV Assumption 
EA  Each-ness Assumption 
n
th   compound amount of th  at time n 
tr   internal rate of return of extra activity 
N   number of outstanding shares at time 0 
N∆   new shares issued at time 1 
 
 
1. The Zero-NPV assumption and the irrelevance of retention 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) (DD) shed light on a neglected issue: Miller and Modigliani 
(MM) prove the dividend irrelevance theorem by excluding the possibility of retaining part 
of the free cash flow (FCF) generated by the investment policy. That is, MM focus on the 
case where a firm distributes a fraction of FCF equal or greater than one. According to DD, it 
is just this assumption that enables MM to prove dividend irrelevance. If retention is allowed, 
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i.e. if managers may choose to distribute only a fraction of the FCF smaller than one, then, 
according to DD, dividend policy is relevant. 
 
Our analysis maintains MM’s assumptions of a frictionless market (no taxes, no flotations 
costs, no transaction costs), and it is assumed that a firm is incorporated at time 0 and 
liquidated at time n.1 The firm is assumed to be unlevered and to follow a fixed (optimal) 
investment policy, which generates periodic free cash flows equal to ta , available for 
distribution to shareholders at time t, nt ,,2,1 K= . 
 
Because this paper aims at showing that relevance or irrelevance has not to do with retention 
or no-retention, we first provide a formal unambiguous definition of dividend irrelevance, to 
avoid any semantic misunderstanding (see next section). Letting td be the dividend 
distributed at time t, we give the following 
 
Definition 1.  The dividend policy is said to be irrelevant if and only if 
 
∑∑
== +=+
n
t
t
t
n
t
t
t da
11 )1()1( ρρ  for any 1,,2,1, −= ntdt K .   (1) 
 
Let Rht ∈  be the extra funds, i.e. ttt adh −= , and let ),,,(: 121 −= nhhhh K
r
. Then, the above 
definition states that dividend policy is irrelevant if, whatever the dividends, the firm value 
does not change: In symbols, letting ∑
= +
+=
n
t
t
tt hahV
1 )1(
)( ρ
r
, the dividend policy is irrelevant if 
)0()(
rr
VhV =  for any choice of hr .2 Note that th  may be positive (dividends are greater than 
FCF) or negative (FCF are not entirely distributed). In the former case, financing is needed to 
raise funds, in the latter case projects must be chosen where the excess cash retained is 
invested. 
 
                                                 
1 The assumption of a finite-time horizon is by no means restrictive, but we believe it is conceptually 
more salient and, strictly speaking, more realistic than the assumption of a firm that is everlasting. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo themselves use this assumption for a better illustration. 
2 The final nh  (and therefore, the final nd ) is not arbitrary, because it is determined by the previous 
extra funds (see Remark 1). 
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The case 0>th  is assumed by MM, whereas DD focus on the case 0<th . 
 
Zero-NPV assumption (ZA). Dividend policy is such that 
0
)1(1
=+∑=
n
t
t
th
ρ       (2) 
 
 
Proposition 1. Dividend policy is irrelevant if and only if ZA holds. 
 
Proof.  Eq. (1)  holds if and only if eq. (2) holds.□ 
 
The above Proposition says that, current stockholders’ wealth does not change if and only if 
the use of extra funds is value-neutral. Stated equivalently, it says that dividend policy is 
irrelevant if the full present value of FCF is distributed to shareholders. 
 
Remark 1. It is worth noting that 0)1(1 =+∑ = −nt tth ρ  is equivalent to 
 
∑−
=
−+−=
1
1
)1(
n
t
tn
tn hh ρ       (3) 
which highlights the dependence of nh  on the previous extra funds. The amount nh  may then 
be seen as the compound amount of all previous extra activities (reinvestments and/or 
financing of extra funds). 
 
For example, if n=2, eq. (2) boils down to 
0
)1(1 2
21 =+++ ρρ
hh  
which may be rewritten as 
)1(12 ρ+−= hh . 
 
If 01 <h , i.e. retention is chosen, then dividend policy is irrelevant if the amount 1h−  is 
invested in a zero-NPV project. In such a case, the reduction in the first dividend is 
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compensated by the distribution of an extra dividend 02 >h  at the final date, such that the 
previous reduction is  neutralized. If 01 >h , i.e. more than 100% of 1a  is distributed, then 
dividend policy is irrelevant if the extra funds are raised from a zero-NPV financing. In their 
1961 paper, MM assume that the extra funds are raised by selling new stocks, and that the 
new shareholders expect a rate of return equal to the cost of capital ρ  (stocks are fairly 
priced). In other words, it is assumed that the firm finances with a zero-NPV financing. In 
such a case, the extra distribution to current shareholders is compensated later by a 
distribution of a smaller dividend to those shareholders, which exactly offsets the extra cash 
previously received. Irrelevance of dividend policy is then based on the coincidence of the 
cost of capital with the expected rate of return of the extra funds, which means that the 
activities undertaken (whether investment or financing) are zero-NPV activities. 
 
Let us have the following 
 
Each-ness Assumption (EA).  Each extra fund th  is used for a zero-NPV activity. 
 
The above assumption means that if 0<th , excess cash is invested at the cost of capital, and 
if 0>th , funds are raised at the cost of capital. Miller and Modigliani assume EA. 
 
Proposition 2. EA is a sufficient condition for dividend policy irrelevance. 
 
Proof. Let nth  be the compound amount, at time n, of th− . EA is formalized as  
n
th =
tn
th
−+− )1( ρ  for each t , t=1, 2, K  , n−1. 
 Therefore, nh  is determined as 
∑∑ −= −−= +−== 1111 )1(nt tntnt ntn hhh ρ , 
which is just eq. (3), or, equivalently, eq. (2). Using Proposition 1 the result is obtained.□ 
 
Remark 2. It is worth noting that EA is sufficient but not necessary: EA implies eq. (2) but is 
not implied. Dividend irrelevance may hold even if each extra activity has nonzero NPV. 
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Suppose the internal rate of return for each activity is r(t), with r(t) ≠ ρ. Then, 
n
t
tnt
t hrh =+− −)1( )(  for each t=1, 2, K  , n−1, which implies  
∑∑ −= −−= +−== 11 )(11 )1(nt tnttnt ntn rhhh , 
whence 0)1( )(
1
=+ −=∑ tttnt rh . However, dividend irrelevance still holds, if  
t
t
n
t
tt
t
n
t
hrh −=
−
= +=+ ∑∑ )1()1( 1)(1 ρ , 
because the latter equality implies 0)1(
1
=+ −=∑ ttnt h ρ .  Therefore, dividend policy holds if 
EA  does not hold, provided that ρ is the internal rate of return (not of each extra activity but) 
of the portfolio of all extra activities. In other terms, it is not necessary that each and every 
NPV be zero, but only that the NPV of the portfolio be zero (see Table 2). As a result, EA 
implies ZA, whereas ZA does not imply EA.3 
 
 
Table 2. Sufficiency and necessity 
 
 Each-ness Assumption Zero-NPV Assumption 
Sufficient 
Necessary 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo draw attention to the fact that Miller and Modigliani do not allow 
retention policy, so that their irrelevance theorem is “an automatic by-product of the 
investment choice” (p. 300). In fact, dividend irrelevance in MM is not automatic, because it 
rests on a crucial assumption that is not adequately underlined in DD’s analysis: MM assume 
that the firm issues new stocks whose expected rate of return is ρ . This means that th  is 
raised at the cost of capital. Putting it differently, Miller and Modigliani assume EA (in 
addition to the assumption of frictionless market).4 According to DD, the major reason why 
                                                 
3 All the other assumptions are obviously taken as valid: No assumption, separately taken, is 
sufficient to achieve MM’s thesis. 
4 We conventionally view EA (or ZA) as an assumption that is added to the assumption of 
‘frictionless market’ just to underline its importance. Evidently, one can consider the term 
‘frictionless market’ as inclusive of all assumptions. In this sense, dividend irrelevance is indeed 
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dividend irrelevance holds in MM’s analysis is their assumption of 0>th , which rules out 
retention: “Automatic optimization of payout policy does occur in Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), but only because they mandate 100% FCF payout” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, 
p. 305). As seen, Propositions 1 and 2 above hold whatever the sign of th , i.e. they hold 
regardless of whether retention is allowed or not. Dividend irrelevance keeps on holding, as 
long as ZA is maintained. And, symmetrically, irrelevance does not hold if ZA does not hold, 
i.e. MM’s result is not guaranteed by the no-retention assumption. 
 
In the two-period example, suppose FCF is partially retained at time 1, so that 01 <h ; if 
excess cash is invested in zero-NPV activities, then 
 
)1(12
2
1 ρ+−== hhh       (4) 
 
which is equivalent to eq. (2) with n=2 Suppose, on the contrary, that an extra distribution of 
FCF is chosen which is financed with a sale of new stocks. If the rate of return expected by 
the new shareholders is the cost of capital ρ, this means that the new shareholders require 
their investment to be a zero-NPV activity. Letting N  be the number of outstanding shares, 
the new shareholders spend 1h  for purchasing ∆N shares of the firm, and will receive 
dividends for a total of [∆N/(N+ ∆N )]a2 at time 2. Given that the required rate of return is 
equal to the cost of capital ρ, the NPV is zero: 
21 )1)((
a
NN
Nh ρ+∆+
∆= .     (5) 
 
The old shareholders will receive a2+h2=[N/(N+ ∆N )]a2, which implies  
 
h2= −[∆N/(N+ ∆N )]a2. 
 
Therefore, eq. (5) becomes  h1 = −h2/(1+ ρ), which is equivalent to eq. (4). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
automatic given the set of assumptions. However, the thesis of any possible theorem is automatic in 
deductive logic, once the set of the assumptions is accepted (see Section 3). 
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In other words, the case of retention (assumed by DD) is mathematically equivalent to the 
case of no-retention (assumed by MM). The only difference resides in the  sign of ht: if 
positive, the activity is a financing; if negative, the activity is an investment. But the sign 
itself is immaterial to the thesis of Propositions 1 and 2; MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem 
does not depend on the assumption of 0>th : it holds even if 0<th , i.e. if retention is 
assumed. And, symmetrically, it does not hold if the zero-NPV assumption does not hold, 
whether th  is positive or negative. Therefore, while DD correctly state that managers may 
choose a suboptimal policy if retention is allowed, their drawing attention to the retention 
case as opposed to MM’s assumption of no-retention is, theoretically, a bit misleading. The 
fundamental point is: does EA hold? Or, more precisely, does ZA hold or does it not? 
 
Thus, it is true that MM prove irrelevance by assuming that the firm distributes more than 
100% of FCF ( 0>th ), but it is also true that dividend irrelevance holds even in the case 
0<th , with which MM do not deal. The key assumption regards the sign of the  NPV, not 
the sign of th  (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Dividend policy is …  
 
 Retention ( 0<th ) No-retention ( 0>th ) 
Zero-NPV 
Nonzero-NPV 
irrelevant 
relevant 
irrelevant 
relevant 
 
The emphasis of DD on the retention case make them neglect that, according to their very 
definition of irrelevance, even in the no-retention case irrelevance does not hold if the key 
assumption (ZA) is ruled out. That the latter is actually the fundamental assumption in the 
dividend irrelevance argument is explicitly stated by MM in their fundamental principle of 
valuation at p. 412, as well as in the following sentence: “Under our basic assumption, 
however, ρ must be the same for all investors, new as well as old. Consequently, the market 
value of the dividends diverted to the outsiders, which is both the value of their contribution 
and the reduction in terminal value of the existing shares, must always be precisely the same 
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as the increase in current dividends” (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, p. 420, italics added). 
Strictly speaking, they are just assuming EA. 
 
 
 
 In other words, the fundamental question is not: 
 
Does the firm pay out more than FCF or does it pay out less than FCF? 
 
which DeAngelo and DeAngelo focus on. The relevant question is: 
 
Are extra activities value-neutral or not? 
 
DD’s paper is actually important because it warns against a common misconception: 
dividend policy does not count, only investment policy counts. On the contrary, investment 
policy is not the only determinant of shareholders’ value; dividend policy is a first-order 
determinant as well. DD correctly underline the fact that if 0<th  managers could act so as to 
create agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986): DD’s focus on retention 
just derives from their will of highlighting the fact that “retention increases managers’ 
opportunities to expropriate stockholders” (p. 313) by selecting negative-NPV projects. 
Therefore, it is important to warn against misinterpretation of the notion of irrelevance. 
However, dividend relevance itself does not depend on retention, but on fulfilment of the 
zero-NPV assumption: dividend policy is relevant or irrelevant in the sense of Definition 1 
depending on whether eq. (2) holds or not, regardless of whether dividends are greater or 
smaller than FCF. The fulfilment of eq. (2) means that the full present value of FCF is 
distributed to shareholders. And the distribution of the full present value of FCF is the crucial 
point, irrespective of ht being positive or negative. 
 
DD’s insistence on the retention/no-retention dichotomy may therefore seem, from a mere 
theoretical point of view, a bit overstated. Yet, there is a sense in which their dichotomy is 
useful. It has to do with managers’ control on the effects of their actions. If retention is 
chosen by managers ( 0<th ), the NPV of the reinvestment depends on whether they choose 
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zero- or nonzero-NPV activities. If, instead, managers choose to distribute dividends in 
excess of the FCF ( 0>th ), then extra funds are raised by issuing new stocks, whose NPV 
does not depend on managers’ actions, but on the rate of return that purchasers of shares 
expect to receive in the future. This means that relevance or irrelevance of dividends may 
depend on investors’ expectations. If retention is chosen, managers have full control on their 
actions and may be tempted to pursue personal objectives. If managers choose distribution of 
extra dividends and new shares are issued, shareholders’ wealth is affected by investors’ 
expectations. This is clearly stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323): 
 
Payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ control, thereby reducing 
managers’ power and making it more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital 
markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital … The problem is how to 
motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or 
wasting it on organization inefficiencies. 
 
Retention has to do with the full control of managers on shareholders’ wealth (Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4. Shareholders’ wealth is controlled by …  
 
 Retention ( 0<th ) No-retention ( 0>th ) 
Manager’s actions 
Investors’ expectations 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
 
 
2. A semantic ambiguity 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo do not merely dwell on the retention case; they also become 
involved in what seems to be a semantic disquisition regarding the meaning of the term 
‘irrelevance’; they correctly write that 
 
provided that managers distribute the full present value of FCF, the timing of those payouts is 
a matter of indifference to stockholders. (p. 303) 
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In the light of Definition 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, their sentence just means that dividend 
policy is irrelevant if EA (or ZA) is assumed. Yet, to DD, “this is not ‘payout policy 
irrelevance’, since managers can also choose policies in the interior of Fig. 2” (pp. 303-4), 
i.e. they can choose suboptimal policies in the feasible set (negative-NPV activities). We 
notice that the possibility of choosing suboptimal policies does not invalidate the fact that  
managers’ actions do not change shareholders’ wealth if the zero-NPV assumption holds, in 
which case managers’ actions are irrelevant in determining shareholders’ wealth. DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo  write that irrelevance is a property of the opportunity set and requires “a one-
to-one correspondence between feasible and optimal policies” (p. 294). Therefore, 
irrelevance means that “all feasible decisions are optimal” (p. 294, p. 312). Suboptimal 
policies are possible with the assumption 0<th  if eq. (2) does not hold, because in this case 
not all feasible decisions are optimal (managers may choose negative-NPV projects). 
Therefore, DD conclude that dividend policy is not irrelevant. But this is a semantic 
convention. One may correctly claim that “all feasible decisions are optimal if the zero-NPV 
assumption is assumed”. Whether or not managers’ actions change shareholders’ wealth is 
indeed relevant to shareholders, but, once established (by assumption) that any of the infinite 
possible dividend policies is value-neutral, then it is irrelevant what managers will do.5 DD 
write that if zero-NPV activities are undertaken by managers, policies are indeterminate (p. 
301) but not irrelevant. The fact that policies are indeterminate or not has nothing to do with 
the fact that policies are irrelevant: if it has been established by assumption that managers 
behave in a value-neutral way (i.e. EA or ZA), dividend policy is irrelevant. Choosing among 
zero-NPV projects may perhaps be indeterminate, but, nonetheless, it is of no relevance to 
shareholders’ wealth (and, as seen, ZA can be met even with projects having different 
NPVs). 
  
Consequently, there is nothing wrong in MM’s result, even if retention is allowed, and while 
MM only cope with the assumption 0>th , their result is easily generalized to the case 
0<th , as we have shown. And there is nothing semantically wrong in the sentence 
“dividend policy is irrelevant if the zero-NPV assumption holds”: it has the same logical 
                                                 
5 Note that if managers invest extra funds th−  in negative-NPV projects for some periods and in 
positive-NPV projects for the other periods, EA is not met; however, ZA is met, if the internal rate of 
return of the portfolio of all extra activities is ρ, which is sufficient for dividend policy irrelevance. 
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status as the sentence “the debt/equity ratio of a firm is irrelevant if the no-arbitrage 
assumption holds”. Essentially, the no-arbitrage principle is to capital structure policy what 
ZA is to dividend policy. A formal definition such as Definition 1 may be a useful tool to 
avoid semantic ambiguity. 
 
However, despite semantic ambiguities, DD’s stance is rather clear and agreeable: MM’s 
irrelevance theorem should not be intended as implying that only investment policy matters, 
while dividend policy is of no concern. Given that MM’s theorem may be erroneously 
interpreted as stating that managers’ decisions on dividends do not change shareholders’ 
wealth, DD’s paper is welcome. Dividend policy does count, because if eq. (2) does not hold, 
then stockholders’ wealth does change under changes in dividend policies. 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly affirm that “the familiar NPV rule for investments … is 
not by itself sufficient to ensure stockholder wealth maximization; an NPV rule for payouts is 
also necessary: (‘distribute the full PV of FCF to currently outstanding shares’)” (p. 295): to 
assume ZA just boils down to adopting such a rule. 
 
So, DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly claim that “anything goes” is not true for dividend 
policy. However, armed with our Definition 1, we may claim: “Anything goes if the zero-
NPV assumption holds”. 
 
3. Epistemological issues and agency costs 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo seem to be particularly worried by the fact that “irrelevance is 
hard-wired into MM (1961) by assumptions that shrink the feasible set to optimal policies” 
(p. 294). MM’s assumptions are such that managers are “constrained to choose optimal 
policies” (p. 304); in this way, “the firm’s opportunity set is artificially constrained to payout 
policies that fully distribute free cash flow”. Their worrying about an assumption that 
‘constrains’ the firm to act in a way that is irrelevant for shareholders is theoretically 
unwarranted. Any mathematical theorem or proposition, any theoretical model that makes 
use of deduction is based on assumptions which constrain the thesis to be valid. The role of 
assumptions  is just to force things so that the thesis is valid. MM’s assumptions are such that 
their thesis holds. And we have proved that their thesis holds even with the assumption 
0<th , which they do no cope with. To understand why no theoretical problems arise with 
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MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem, just think of the well-known Extreme Value Theorem 
(EVT): if a real-valued function  is continuous in a closed, bounded interval [a, b], then such 
a function attains both a maximum and a minimum value in [a,b]. Obviously, the 
assumptions here force the thesis to be valid. Let the set of all real-valued functions be the 
feasible set, and let a choice be defined optimal if a function is chosen which attains a 
maximum and minimum value in [a, b]. The assumptions of the EVT force the validity of the 
thesis because the choice of any function is optimal if assumptions are met. Therefore, the 
choice of any function fulfilling the assumptions is (perhaps indeterminate but nonetheless) 
irrelevant. It is evident that the original feasible set (real-valued functions) is now restricted 
to a narrower set (real-valued functions continuous in a closed bound interval) where choice 
is irrelevant. But this is just the epistemological role of assumptions. Without assumptions, 
there would be no significant result. So, MM’s use of EA (which implies ZA) does restrict 
the feasible set, and so do the other assumptions about frictionless market. 
 
The fact that MM’s “proof makes no assumption about managerial objectives” (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 296) does not invalidate MM’s result logically, for the same reason 
why the fact that EVT makes no assumption about, say, monotonicity does not invalidate 
EVT. In MM’s theorem, no room is left for conflict between managers and shareholders. If 
managerial objectives and agency problems are of particular concern, one should attack 
neither MM’s thesis nor any of their assumptions on a logical or semantic level; one could 
explicitly refuse an assumption and set a different result. Possibly, DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo’s intention is just to reject MM’s thesis empirically, which implies (by modus 
tollens) that (at least) one of MM’s assumptions is empirically unacceptable. But DD point 
the finger at 0>th , which is a redundant assumption, because MM’s thesis holds with 
0<th  as well. The key assumption is ZA: if this assumption is removed, MM’s result is not 
implied by the other assumptions. In terms of the EVT, it is as if, for example, one 
considered non-monotonic functions: monotonicity has nothing to do with EVT’s thesis, so 
the theorem holds for non-monotonic functions as well. From a logical point of view, no 
problem lies in the thesis nor in the (redundant) assumption of monotonicity.6  
                                                 
6 One might say that comparing a mathematical theorem with a proposition bearing economic content 
is not admissible. However, we are just comparing the logical structures that the two Propositions 
share: Both are deductive arguments with one thesis which follows from a set of assumptions. This 
schema is rather obvious in any scientific field that makes use of deduction. 
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To claim that in MM’s paper “irrelevance obtains, but only in an economically vacuous 
sense” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 293) is not correct if this means that the 
assumption of no-retention is restrictive. If, instead,  one refers ‘economically vacuous’ to 
ZA and means that ZA is empirically refutable, then  the sentence may be accepted, not as a 
logical truth, but as an empirical evidence. If MM’s intention was to prove a thesis given a 
set of assumptions, the set of assumptions guarantee the thesis; and we have seen that this set 
of assumptions may be relaxed to allow for retention, which means that MM’s result is 
untouched. Whether or not MM’s assumptions hold, i.e. whether or not they are realistic, 
acceptable, empirically justifiable etc. is a totally different issue. 
 
We stress that our stance should be intended as a reinterpretation and a clarification of DD’s 
results, not as a critique. As anticipated, their dichotomy retention/no-retention is useful, 
because it is strictly connected with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency problems: if 
agency problems are assumed, ZA must be abandoned in order to provide a more realistic 
scenario. Managers may control shareholders’ wealth with dividend policy, either by 
choosing retention of funds or by choosing extra distribution of dividends, but they have full 
control of shareholders’ wealth only if they select retention rather than extra distribution of 
dividends. This is the reason why retention is important: DeAngelo and DeAngelo deserve 
credit for underlining that agency theory makes MM’s assumptions inappropriate, although it 
is ZA, not retention, that has to be considered inappropriate. Agency problems conflict with 
ZA because managers are inclined to retain part of the FCF to pursue personal objectives, a 
problem that in MM’s treatment of dividend policy does not arise. Removing the zero-NPV 
assumption, agency problems comes to the fore (or, vice versa, coming agency problems to 
the fore, ZA is removed) and the fact that full controllability of shareholders’ wealth is 
possible only with retention make managers eager of distracting funds from distribution (see 
Table 5, where the first case refers to the MM’s assumptions and thesis). Whether this is 
compensated or not by the need of increasing dividends in the attempt of manipulating price 
has to do with the introduction of a further assumption in the model: dividend policies bear 
(or do not bear) informational content (signalling theory). 
 
In essence, the following sentences hold: 
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1. MM prove that dividend irrelevance holds with a set of assumptions, among which 
are EA and 0>th  
2. MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem holds even if EA is replaced by ZA, which does 
not require that each activity has a zero NPV 
3. MM’s dividend  irrelevance theorem holds even if the assumption 0>th  is removed, 
allowing for any choice of Rht ∈ , t = 1, 2, …  , n−1 
4. MM does not hold if ZA is removed 
5. the assumption of managers pursuing personal objectives is incompatible with ZA 
(unless personal objectives and shareholders’  objectives coincide). Therefore 
6. to assume that managers pursue personal objectives means that ZA is removed, 
because agency problems are present 
7. if ZA is removed, dividend policy is relevant. 
 
 
 
Table 5. ZA out, agency problems in 
 
F F F F 
FIP FIP FIP FIP 
EA ZA AP AP 
Set of assumptions 
0>th   0<th  0>th * 
 
Dividends irrelevance 
 
YES YES NO NO 
 
Dividend depends on 
 
— — managers new shareholders 
F=Frictionless market   FIP=Fixed investment policy 
AP=Agency problems   *The sign of th  is a managers’ choice 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper first sets aside any linguistic ambiguity of the expression  “dividend irrelevance” 
by introducing the formal unambiguous Definition 1, according to which one may say that 
dividend policy is irrelevant if the following key assumption is made: the portfolio of extra 
activities has zero NPV. Therefore, relevance or irrelevance does not depend on the fact that 
retention is allowed or not. From a mathematical perspective, the major dichotomy is zero-
NPV/nonzero-NPV, which enables one to extend Miller and Modigliani’s (1961)  result even 
in the retention case studied by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006). Therefore, MM’s 
assumption of no-retention is irrelevant, while the zero-NPV assumption (ZA) is relevant, 
because if the assumption 0>th  is removed MM’s dividend theorem still holds, whereas if 
one removes ZA,  MM’s theorem does not hold any more. 
 
The dichotomy retention/no-retention is nonetheless useful: if retention is chosen by 
managers, then NPV is determined by managers’ actions; if extra-distribution is chosen by 
managers, NPV is determined by expectations of new shareholders. In other words, 
shareholders’ wealth is fully controllable by managers only in case of retention. Thus, 
retention has not to do with irrelevance (the zero-NPV assumption is the cardinal 
assumption) but has to do with the controllability of shareholders' wealth by managers. 
Managers have incentive in retaining funds because they can fully control shareholders’ 
wealth. Therefore, one may certainly claim that retention bears a strong  relation to dividend 
irrelevance issues if agency problems are assumed. Reinterpreting this way DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo’s paper, their contribution is noteworthy in that it not only sweeps away any 
misbelief that dividend policy is, in general, irrelevant, but also allows us to ask for removal 
of ZA, which is in contrast with Jensen’s (1986) agency theory: managers are inclined to 
retain funds, which makes the possibility of negative-NPV activities highly realistic. 
 
Whether managers may have some power on shareholders’  wealth even in the case of no-
retention with issues of new stocks, depends on whether a further assumption is added: 
managers may influence shareholders’  expectations. 
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